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The Social and Economic Views of Mr. Justice Brandeis. Col-
lected, with Introductory Notes, by Alfred Lief. With a Fore-
ward by Charles A. Beard. New York, The Vanguard Press,
1930. pp. xxi, 419. $4.50.
WHEN one writes a book and also the title to it, a reviewer should, I think,
take it or leave it, title and all, as he finds it.' But when the book consists
of the selected opinions of a great jurist, introduced and bound together
by a titular ligature chosen by the collector to foreshow its contents, surely
a reviewer may, and if he is a lawyer, I think he must, in limine, raise
and dispose of the question of variance between title and contents. Espe-
cially is this so when, as here, the opinions represent the juridical think-
ing of a strong and vigorous personality, whose ardor in championing, and
skill and success in advocating causes before, and whose virile thinking
and trenchant style since he came to the Bench have in some quarters
made not only his writings but himself, a controversial subject.
The title chosen, I think, both in what it says and in what it does not
say, fails to make for the reader the essential distinction between the judge
qua person, and the judge, qua judge, and in effect promises him that he
will find in the book not the juridical, but the personal and economic views
of the writer. Is this an accurate characterization of its contents? I
do not think so.
In a juridical sense every legal opinion represents and always has repre-
sented the social and economic views of its writer, whether lawyer or
judge, because long before there was a science of sociology or political
economy law was, and it concerned itself then as it does now and always
will, with the social and economic relations of mankind. But by the same
token this same law, this science of action, concerned as it has been and is
with life as it has moved along, and with the social facts of life at the
point of controversy and conflict, has long since developed a methodology
and technique of approach to and treatment of economic and social facts
and relations, distinctive of and peculiar to itself, to which its servant,
the lawyer and the judge, must of inexorable necessity, because he may
not wrest judgment, conform. True it is, as it always has been and al-
ways will be, that the great lawyer, the great judge, is the product of his
life and thinking, and that to great judging imagination, intuition, courage,
high ideals, a feeling of and for justice, are quite as essential as the
"being long accustomed to and acquainted with the judicial decisions of
their predecessors" of Blacktone, and that "when formal rules have failed
the judge he must trust to his own skill in finding the proper decision,
which when found, he is not permitted to refuse."
But however true it is that "the settled and normal part to be played
by the judge in the development of the law consists in a personal mental
activity" and that "whenever it is the duty of the judge to discover what
the law is in fields in which it has not been formulated, the considera-
tions that mtgst guide him jn accordance with the end to be obtained are
exactly the same as those which would influence the legislator, for the one,
as well as the other, aims at promoting by appropriate rule, the ends of
judicial and social utility", still it remains inescapably true that the
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nature of his function greatly circumscribes the freedom of action of the
judge. For in no case is it permitted to him to declare as law any social
or economic views he may hold, unless those views juridically arrived
at, square with and conform to the law as he actually believes it to be.
And more-while the judge may in his struggle to find the law in such
cases almost invent a new category, he can never quite do that, for since
the growth by the judicial process of the law is interstitial, the judge will
feel uncomfortable if the category he chooses cannot be made to find con-
tact and placement in the midst of prior related categories.
If these views be sound, and what informed one can gainsay them, it
goes without saying that this book, consisting of the opinions of a great
judge, the arguments of a no less great lawyer, contains not the personal,
but the juridical thinking of the writer, and the social and economic views
presented in it are those views which his juridical thinking has revealed
to him as law.
It must not be taken, however, that I believe or profess that the contents
of this book will be found colorless and without flavor; or that the opinions,
the result of juridical thinking, must be because of that fact no different
from those held or announced by any other lawyer or judge. To so con-
tend would be a flying in the face of legal history, enriched as it is with
the precious life blood of its master spirits, treasured up to a life beyond
life, studded and adorned as it is with their great and brilliant names. I
merely maintain that however much the opinions of great lawyers and
judges may and do differ from each other in substance and in style, the
views expressed in them represent the differences not in their personal,
but in their jurisprudential outlook and point of view.
I propose therefore, but with diffidence, in lieu of Mr. Lief's, this title for
the book: "The Influence upon the Juridical Thinking of Mr. Justice
Brandeis of his Jurisprudential Point of View."
Mr. Beard in his introduction, written so beautifully and with such un-
derstanding, has nearly but not quite made the point which I am laboring.
He has drawn with exquisite precision and delicacy a pen picture of
Brandeis, the man, Brandeis the justice, and has set down precisely and
with vividness the quality of his thinking. He has failed, however, to point
to what the book itself shows, the deep springs from which this thinking
flows.
"All his reasoning is 'orderly'. His speeches, arguments and judicial
opinions march. He has a passion for concrete things, rather than ab-
stractions; pertinent data revealing the intimate relation of laws and
judicial decisions to practical affairs. Above all, he seeks to draw his juris-
prudence out of the realities of life-its work, its economy, and its social
arrangements."
"We may be sure that the fact-burdened method which he has employed
in all his thinking about legal and economic affairs will have an increasing
influence on coming generations of students, lawyers, and judges. Humanity
and ideas, as well as things, are facts, and a jurisprudence which takes
them into account cannot perish from the earth."
Almost I say, but not gquite has he made the point I labor. Almost, in
that he has set down the facts which sustain it. Not quite, in that wittingly
or unwittingly, he has failed to point out with the ungrudging emphasis
which it deserves, the dominant fact in the life and thinking of Mr. Justice
Brandeis, that he is first of all a lawyer, and that all his mature thinking
has therefore been juridical. It is this dominant desire to square law
with life, and life with law, which the writings in the book reveal that
has given vigor and power to his judicial marches across the field of law,
and made him with his keen and practical sense of justice, dominated and
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inspired as it is by great ideals, a tremendously vital force in integrating
law in America with the life it serves.
One who reads this book searching for the viewpoint of the writer, must
feel that paramount over every other there has always been in the mind
of Mr. Brandeis the idea of the invincible supremacy of law, and in his
soul a passion against lawlessness, a yearning for legal righteousness. It
is because this is so -that his juridical thinking on social and economic
questions in terms of their part in and their relation to established or
establishable legal systems, has always been practical, forceful and on the
march.
It is at once apparent that these are not the writings of a mystic oracle,
a dreaming idealist, improvising on impulse. Rather they are those of a
downright pragmatic legal philosopher, a sound and brilliant lawyer,
equipped with a steady and powerful mind. In them speaks one who
from long study and experience, profoundly perceiving that "Law is a
science of action based on the facts of social life which it aims to so order
and arrange as that the consequences flowing from them are those which
are socially desirable", and that "laws are the product of life", uses all the
abundant learning and experience of his life to find and declare the law
in conformity with that "reality of the moment which life is at each instant
forging."
The second characteristic of Mr. Justice Brandeis' juridical thinking
which will, I think, strike the reader of these opinions, is that he is neither
jealous nor afraid of legislative law, but gladly accepts and gives full
effect to it; that he has no patience with that jurisprudence of conceptions
which by laying down fixed and universal rules, would keep society static.
Profoundly acquainted as these writings show him to be with the historical
bases of the law, and the importance of its slow, steady and powerful
growth through the long processes of judicial inclusion and exclusion, they
show also that he realizes fully that there come times when the effort to
discover and develop law by this slow and painful process bears too hardly
on the many litigants affected, and that then direct and vigorous legis-
lation must be had to provide new and better starting points, more in
accord with the facts of life, from which courts may proceed.
These opinions show that the juridical thinking of Mr. Justice Brandeis
squares with Geny's view that "the needs of actual life must never be
sacrificed to mere concepts", and with that of Mr. Justice Holmes "that
every opinion tends to become a law". Its general viewpoint is that when
a sufficient force of public opinion has gathered behind a social theory to
bring about its legislative articulation into law, courts should not let any
vague and nebulous imagined brooding spirit of the law strike it down,
but should give it effect and scope unless it transgresses some positive
provision of the fundamental law. Mr. Justice Brandeis' juridical thinking
gladly accepts and gives full effect to legislative law.
A third characteristic of his juridical thinking is that it is realistic.
It is very evident that Mr. Justice Brandeis believes in the tremendous
importance of facts, not only the facts of the past and the facts of the
present, but the beckoning facts of the future. He knows that while ab-
stract conceptions must serve not only as guide and anchor to juridical
thinking, but as fruitful sources in a constantly expanding system of law
for increasing the "scope and fecundity" of legal principles, "the simple
observation of social facts must have first place among the indispensable
elements of juridical method"; that the truth is at last that from the chang-
ing facts of life law emerges, and no amount of sophistry or abstract
reasoning can put this stubborn fact down.
And yet, factualist though his opinions show him to be, they also show
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that he is never buried under his facts. He is their master, not their
servant. He knows as well as any that "facts are nothing except in rela-
tion to desire", that "they are sterile unless there are minds capable of
chasing between them and discerning those which conceal something and
recognizing that which is concealed. Minds which under the bare fact
see the soul of the fact;" that "there is in the human intellect a power
of expansion, I might almost call it a power of creation, which is brought
into play by the simple brooding upon facts." They show too that while
he knows that "the rules of practical morals are the product of life, that
it is life which in its course determines each appropriate stopping point,
that implies its appropriate laws." He also knows full well that "the
play of the obscure forces of nature is powerless of itself to create true
juridical customs. The incessant collaboration of man is needed; judges
are daily called upon to discover and initiate, and to exercise in the name
of the people, the freedom of the social will.'
I have reserved for the last, comment upon that glowing quality in his
juridical thinking which, springing from a feeling which culminates in
advocacy for what is just, makes his mind luminous and gives it in difficult
cases the power and the will to range when the track is cold, to cast in
ever widening circles to find a fresh scent. It is the quality of advocacy
which, lighting and warming his style, wings his words home, and gives
to his arguments persuasiveness and power, whether he is pounding away
with fact upon fact, authority upon authority,-for he esteems and freely
uses authorities as the most potent of facts-in some of his great dissent-
ing opinions, or writing the law of the case in his less argumentative,
because more authoritative opinions for the majority.
Somewhere Goethe says: "A thorough advocate in a just cause, a pene-
trating mathematician facing the starry heavens, alike bear the semblance
of divinity."
Practical men, and in that classification, since "law is the science of
action", judges must be included, must have impulses. The lawyer has
them, and because he has them his work is tremendously important. If
a lawyer merely reasoned abstractly and without motive, he would do the
judge no good. But the driving impulse to bring about his client's success
not only makes him burrow industriously for precedents, and as industri-
ously bring them forth, but also makes him belabor and cudgel the brains
of the listening judge to bring him into agreement.
If the judge sat upon the Bench in a purely abstract relation to the
cause, his mind merely a recording instrument, his opinions in difficult
eases would be of little worth. He must have some motive to fire his
brains, to "let his mind be bold." By the nature of his occupation he
cannot have advocacy for either side of the case as such, so he becomes
an advocate, an earnest one, for the-in a way-abstract right solution.
Having become such advocate, his mind reaches and strains and feels for
that result. He says with Elihu, the son of Barachel, the Buzite of the
family of Ram: "There is a spirit in man, and the breath of the Al-
mighty giveth him understanding. It is not the great that are wise, nor
the aged that understand justice. Hearken to me; I also will show mine
opinion. For I am full of matter; the spirit within me constraineth me.
Behold my belly is as wine which hath no vent; like new wineskins it is
ready to burst."
And so the book presents him to the reader as he has gone marching
through the world, his keen and cultivated mind the servant of his soul.
Whether maintaining the liberty to think, to speak and to utter freely
above all liberties, as in his opinions upon Freedom of Speech; denouncing
the lawlessness of government agents, affirming that not only men and
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groups of men but governments themselves must stand accountable to
law; upon varying facts upholding legislative acts as lawful or opposing
them as unlawful invasions of liberty; affirming in one case that the law
should stand as decided, in another that "stare decisis is not an inexorable
rule"; that "modification implies growth; it is the life of the law"; denounc-
ing unreasonable practices in restraint of trade, or upholding reasonable
practices for the maintenance of fair prices, he is at once pragmatist and
idealist, idealist and pragmatist. A pragmatist, he wants to know of
every legal rule or institution under review-is it in accordance with
the law? Has it worked, does it work, will it work? An idealist, he
also wants to know, has it worked well, will it work well, does it work
well: if not, an idealistic pragmatist, he wants to know, can it by modifica-
tion be made to work well?
If, concluding this review, I should yield a little to the temptation to
characterize the thinking of the writer, not only juridically, but personally,
I should say of it that it is the thinking of one who perhaps unconsciously,
has yet faithfully followed the Pauline injunction: "Quench not the spirit;
despise not prophesyings; prove all things; hold fast that which is good."
HOUSTON, TEXAS. JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR.
The Bramble Bush: Some Lectures on Law and Its Study. By
K. N. Llewellyn. New York, Columbia University School of
Law, 1930. pp. ix, 158.
THis is no mere law book. It is an important piece of literary art, the
reflection of a rich personality. It is a worthy successor, for our times,
to Holmes' Path of The Law: a brilliant survey for students and lawyers of
what law is and what legal education does and can do to make a man a
lawyer. The style is charmingly racy, colloquial, contemporary. Writ-
ten primarily for students-but appealing to all intelligent lawyers-
this book discusses admirably in the homeliest terms some of the most
difficult and important legal problems.
First, what is law about? What is the place of law and lawyers in
society? Law, says Llewellyn, has to do with maintaining order. It
does not make order, but keeps it from being disrupted when disputes
arise, "maintaining order when it has gotten out of order." The doing
of something about disputes-dispute-settlement and dispute-avoidance,-
that is law. The function of lawyers is (a) the handling of specific suits
caused by disputes (getting the judge to do what you would like to have
him do). and (b) counselling laymen how to shape their conduct in antici-
pation of what courts are likely to do if a dispute arises; and, as a part
of that job, inventing "devices to make it easier for people to accomplish
what they want in their relations with other people." Thus oriented, it is
easy to see that "the meaning of law in life and in the practice of lawyers
is its meaning not to courts, but to laymen."
But if dispute-settling is the thing to be stressed, then, says Llewellyn,
the lawyer needs to know how courts will settle disputes, how to get courts
to settle them as his client desires. This leads to a study of the "so-called
rules of law which judges say they are bound by." But the lawyer must
look to see "whether what judges say matches with what they do."
The so-called rules are mere "pretty playthings" except "so far as they help
you see or predict what judges will do, or so far as they help you to get
judges to do something."'
1 There is a recent tendency of critics of nascent "legal realism" to
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How the law school aids and fails to aid in the learning of what courts
and lawyers do, is the main theme. The study of cases, the doctrine of
precedents, the effect of statutes, the analysis of legal concepts, the weal-
nesses of the case system,-these and other problems are searchingly
considered.
Here is a book to read many times, be you law school student or that
somewhat humbler type of student, a sensible practicing lawyer. You will
find it hard-headed yet (or, rather, and) vigorously idealistic.
There is much to admire. But there are some things to quarrel with.
It is trite yet ever true that, if you find a man's strength, nearby you will
find his weakness. Llewellyn wants to see every side of all his problems.
He wants to know the old solutions and the new. He is eager about the
latter but he demands that attention be paid to the former. He opposes
"either-or" thinking, and is all for "both-and" thinking. All of which is
splendid, especially in a man who is one of the leaders in the minority
"movement" known as "Legal Realism." He constantly serves notice on his
fellow pioneers to conserve, to repair, but not to destroy, the ancient atti-
tudes, the traditional tools of legal thought. Last year he made plain this
point of view:
"It is along the same line that I feel strongly the unwisdom, when turning
the spotlight on behavior, of throwing overboard emphasis on rules, con-
cepts, ideology, and ideological stereotypes or patterns. These last are, by
themselves, confusing, misleading, inadequate to describe or e-xplain. But
a Jurisprudence which was practically -workable could not have been built
in terms of them, if they had n ot cotainted a goodly core of tnth and
sense. To be sure, it was not the precept-ideology of jurisprudence, but
the practice that jurisprudence only partly mirrored, which actually worked.
But one thing sociological study ought to do for the advance of science is
to school the advocates of new insight against which they are rebelling.
The rebelling indicates inadequacy in the old. It does not indicate that
the old did not have Tnuch solid basis. The bare fact that the old czist-,
could came into existence and persist, evidaccs that it had. If we can
examine it for what it has, and carry that with us into a new alignment,
we shall do much to reduce the well-known pendulum swing from exagger-
ation to exaggeration. This is of less moment in the early stages of a new
movement. The innovator carries over willy-nilly the virtues of the same
training against which he is in intellectual revolt. But those newly trained
in the new school will be half-trained unsound exaggerators, if the original
innovators fail to incorporate in their doctrine as in their practice the life-
attempt to damn that movement by unfairly calling it "behaviorism."
That label has been pre-empted by Watson whose glibly optimistic psy-
chology is entirely unacceptable to most of those who advocate patient
study of what courts do in fact.
There is as little warrant for the critics to ascribe to most legal realists
the beliefs (1) that any psychological, economic or statistical studies will
yield any certain bases for predicting specific decisions; or (2) that there
are no rational or ethical factors in legal thinking. The point is that the
rational and ethical factors are thwarted in thir operations by the cozvcn-
tional tendency to ignore the non-rational and. non-ethical factors. Llew-
ellyn's article, A Realistic Jurisprdence-The Next Step (1930), 30 COL.
L. REv. 431, first gave the name "a realistic jurisprudence" to the point
of view of a certain minority "movement." It was doubtless this "move-
ment" that Dean Pound had in mind in his recent article, The Call For a
Realistic Jurispndence (1930), 44 HARV. L. Rsv. 697, which purports to
describe the outstanding characteristics of that "movement." Anyone who
reads THE BimLE BUSH or Llewellyn's article just cited will find difficulty
in believing that Dean Pound's description is even approximately accurate.
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power of the older school, even while attacking the latter's false emphasis
and implications." 2
There is much soundness in this declaration of the wisdom of moderation.
But, too, it is, in part, exaggerated moderation, moderation become exces-
sive. "The bare fact that the old exists, could come into existence and
persists" is not adeiuate evidence that the "old had much solid basis" or
"contained a goodly core of truth and sense." It is some evidence; it does
unquestionably raise a presumption of value. But, from the point of view
of human values, many an old thing was evil when it came and/or is still
evil in its persistence.3 With thought contrivances weighted with super-
stitions and unscrutinized dogmas, men have often built workable institu-
tions. But the workability has been hindered by the superstitions and erro-
neous dogmas. Many institutions have been built and maintained in the
face of such disadvantages. And it will not do at all to say that because
a practically workable institution has survived, although built in terms of
superstitions and dogmas, that this practical workability proves that those
superstitions and dogmas "contained a goodly core of trtth, and sense"
or had "much solid basis." Such an argument is the equivalent of contend-
ing that streptococcus germs and tuberculosis are substantial aids to human
health because mankind is passably healthy despite these handicaps.
All of which relates more or less to Llewellyn's handling of stare dccisis
and the value of the "formal-law" way of looking at decisions. Nowhere
have the artificiality and bad effects of that approach been more devas-
tatingly set forth than in the Bramble Bush. But, almost in the same
breath, Llewellyn pleads for its utility, its positive social significance.
First he elaborately describes the folly of arid formalism.4 Then (influ-
enced by his "it-existed-and-exists-therefore-it-must-have-a-solid-core-of-
truth" attitude) he proclaims that the syllogistic-reasoning-from-major-
premises-supposed-to-be-found-in-precedents-system promotes "the common
weal". "We see," he writes, "wisdom made institutional, caught up and
crystallized into a working system; by way of logic the weak judge is
penned up within the walls his predecessors built; by way of logic, the
strong judge can scale those walls when in his judgment that is needed.
And either phase, and both, promote the common weal."
2 Llewellyn, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 462, n.
3 There is much to be said for Manichaeism. Of course, some evils have
fortuitous consequences which may be valuable. A recent medical writer
traces the Reformation in England to the fact that Henry VIII had syphilis.
If you believe that story and if you are glad that England quit the Romish
faith, you may perhaps be delighted that syphilis came to plague mankind.
On the other hand, the mere fact than an institution has been abandoned
does not prove its lack of value.
4 No summary will do justice to his criticism. The sharpest attack is on
the "two-headed," "Janus-faced" aspect of the doctrine of precedent:
(1) There is the strict view which "confines the case to is particular
facts." This is "in practice the dogma which is applied to unwelcome
cases. It is the recognized, legitimate, honorable technique for whittling
precedents away, for making the lawyer, in his argument, and the court
in its decision, free of them." (2) There is the "loose view." Argument
is based upon language found in past decisions, language used largely
"without reference to the facts of the case which called the language forth."
"This is a device for capitalizing welcome precedents." It, too, is "recog-
nized, legitimate, honorable." Accordingly, the precedent doctrine is really
two contradictory doctrines. See also his excellent discussion of the diffi-
culty that "the raw events as they happened are not before judge or jury;
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Now those statements will not stand up. Adequately to develop the
lurking fallacies would take many pages.G But it is possible to hint at
some of the more obvious fallacies of this statement that the conventional
theory promotes the common weal because it serves to hem in the weak
or unskilful or ignorant judge, while it is no impediment to the strong
or skilful judge: 6
(1) The ignorant, unskilful judge-precisely because he is ignorant and
unskilful-frequently blunders unwittingly out of the clutches of the both-
ersome precedent. As Goodhart says, "Cases which have been decided on
incorrect premises or reasoning" have often established "new principles"
of which "their authors were unconscious or which they have misunder-
stood.... Paradoxical as it may sound, the law has frequently owed more
to its weak judges than to its strong ones." 7 (2) The skilful judge may be
weak in courage or common sense. As Street puts it, "It will not infre-
quently be found that the judge of greatest legal acumen, the greatest
analyzer, is the very one who resists innovation." 8 (3) The strong judge
who is not skilful (or the skilful strong judge when too fatigued to use
his strength and skill) may let himself be dragooned by a precedent into
injustice. As Llewellyn himself recognizes, precedents may bind "a strong
judge by the errors of the weak." (4) The strong and/or skilful judge
is not necessarily the scrupulous, conscientious, socially-minded judge. He
may be dishonest or a bigot, a tyrant, and dominated by anti-social preju-
dices. His skill in apparently syllogizing from the precedents often enables
such a judge the better to conceal his ill-doings and to make his unwise
or unjust decisions seem to favor the common weal.9 (5) The dishonest
judge, although weak and unskilful, can easily cover up his conduct by
having a skilful opinion, replete with citations, written for him by the
skilful attorney for the party he favors.
Syllogistic reasoning using as major premises doctrines or "rules" found
in previous opinions has some effect on decisions; that no sane person
would deny.'0 How much effect no one knows. But an increasing number
there has been a straining process"; of the use of artificially prepared
statements of facts in judicial opinions to make them "look sound, look
right, persuade"; of the obstacles to accurate prediction of decisions
because of the impossibility of guessing the attitude of future judges with
respect to past cases; of how "major premises still are dictated by a con-
clusion desired and already fixed"; and of the fundamental inadequacy of
legal theories resulting from restricting attention solely to the opinions
of upper courts.
5 Some of those pages could be taken from THE BRMITBLE BUSH.
6 See pages 64, 65, 71. Llewellyn seems to treat as equivalents the terms
"weak," "unskilful" and "ignorant" on the one hand, and "strong" and
"skilful" on the other.
T Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case (1930), 40 YAIE
L. J., 161, 164. The use above of the quotation from Goodhart is not to be
taken as an acceptance of his views of "law" or "principles".
81 STREET, FOUI.DATIONS OF LEGAL LLiLrry (190G), 343. Cf. Llew-
ellyn's own comment (p. 64) on 'the effect of "the finer minds" on the
perpetuation of "orthodoxy".
9 Cf. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930), 137. Per contra
Llewellyn (p. 62) : "If he is biased or corrupt the existence of past prac-
tices to compare his action with gives a public check upon his biases anid
his corruption, limits the frame in which he can indulge them unchallenged."




of observers-including Llewellyn-are ready to say that the effect is very
considerably less than is conventionally supposed. As yet we know little
about how much effect it has, and we are certainly in no position today
to say that the effect is always, or usually, or often, beneficent.
We do know something about the evil consequences of the conventional
theory. According to the theory, all decisions are born of the wedlock of cold
logic and stable precedents, and any decisions born out of that wedlock are
assumed to be illegitimate. That belief frequently thwarts and distorts clear
legal thinking and interferes with the well working of court justice, for it
compels lawyers and judges to suppress both the expression and the frank
recognition of many important factors that affect and produce decisions,
and to devote countless precious hours to the articulation of distorted and
inaccurate "reasons" for decisions 11 in terms of artificial so-called legal
"rules." 12 Of all this Llewellyn writes at length and most effectively.
It is, then, with a shock that one comes upon his statement that the old
theory promotes the common weal. For it is not keeping a sane balance,
it is not serving the ends of good pedagogy, to say, in effect, at one and
the same time: (1) The conventional theory frequently shows up as, in
large part, a sorry sham, a harmful survival, an impediment to good judicial
work; (2) The conventional theory "promotes the common weal."
There are times when "both-and" will not serve. There are antitheses,
there are choices between alternatives. There is such a thing as a middle
of the road position, and it is often sound. But there is no such thing
as following at once two roads at the cross-roads, riding on two trains
going in opposite directions.
Llewellyn could properly say: "The traditional theory must be studied.
Woe be unto you if you overlook it when addressing the judges. There is,
too, a wealth of good common sense and shrewd wiseness buried in the so-
called rules. But improvement of the judicial process requires that the
old theory be drastically overhauled because it is hopelessly inisdescriptive
of what courts do in fact." Or he could say: "The conventional theory
exists, it contains elements of value worth preserving, although its evil
consequences are moderately obvious. What is its net worth, I don't know,
nor does anyone else as yet. Whether and when and how much it serves
the common weal, is today unknown."
But, whatever he says, he must elect where to place his emphasis-
unless he is content (and he is not'13 ) to say: "There is no good way or
better way, and there is no bad way or worse way; there are only ways,
and they all look alike to me." You see what Llewellyn has done. His
belief that what has been and survives must be somehow good, his eager-
ness to be open-minded, his leaning over backwards when judging what he
1 See Thurman Arnold's brilliant article, Criminal Attempts-The Rise
anl Fall of an Abstraction (1930), 40 YALE L. J. 53.
12 The legal "realists" in denying the tenets of conventional formal-law
do not write themselves down nominalists. They do not deny that in the
legal field or elsewhere there are "universal or repeatable abstract quali-
ties, relations and transformations which characterize objects and events
and constitute their objective meaning." [See Morris Cohen, Justice
Holmes and The Nature of the Law (1931), 31 COL. L. Ruv.- 352, 361.)
They do question whether most of the so-called legal rules correctly state
such repeatables in the conduct of courts. To say that some alleged chemi-
cal theories are wrong is not to deny the possibility of all chemical theories.
One may be doubtful whether 2X8=28 without accepting pyrrhonism as a
philosophy.
13 Else he would not bother about the common weal.
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adversely criticizes-these have betrayed him at moments into incorporating
into his description of the traditional theory a too emphatically favorable
appraisal of the social benefits of the old ways. That appraisal is puzz-
lingly at variance with most of what he writes elsewhere in the same book.
One ventures thus to find this much fault 14 just because Llewellyn is
one of the ablest, subtlest, most hard-working of Holmes' disciples. He has
already done much, but this book is crammed full of hints of far more
to come. No false use of the notion of a golden mean should mar his splen-
did contributions to the teaching and practice of law. Let him dare to be
daring, let him not check his notable creative impulses for fear of offending
the false god of "good form" 1. masquerading as the comic spirit.1
New York City. JEROME FWN,'K.
Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Fbzance. By
Adolf A. Berle, Jr. St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1930.
pp. xv, 911.
THInS book is not, as might be inferred from its title, merely a collection
of materials on the strictly financing aspects of corporation law, such as
the issue of securities, merger and consolidation, and reorganization. It is
the product of a fundamental re-examination of the principles of corpora-
tion law from the point of view of the security holder, and includes by far
the greater part of the subject matter of the traditional courze on private
corporations, as well as other matters discussed in other courses or not at
all. The material is divided into two parts, the first, under the heading "The
Corporate Organism", embracing two-thirds of the book, and the second
dealing with "The Processes of Financing".
The first part opens with a consideration of the corporate contract: the
relation between the state, the corporation, and the shareholder, with the
emphasis principally upon the conflict between the strict shareholders'
"property right" theory illustrated in the New Jersey cases, and the theory
of the Delaware courts, that the shareholders have conceded to the man-
agement very broad powers to alter their interests by new financing
projects. In connection with these cases, Mr. Berle introduces the student
to his theory of management powers as "powers in trust" for the benefit
of all security holders. The cases in this section appear to the writer
an excellent selection; and there is added an interesting tabulation show-
ing the striking trend toward Delaware as a state of incorporation.' The
succeeding section, on the corporate management, includes material on
the resionsibility of directors, non-voting stock, voting trusts, and various
forms of "non-titular" management: dominant stockholders, etc.
A section dealing with the rights of various classes of shareholders fol-
lows, consisting of almost 300 pages. It opens with explanatory material
on the concept of corporate capital from the points of view of economics,
accounting, and law. The problem of introducing students who have had
no accounting training to the treacherous terms "capital", "capital stock",
and "surplus", and to their confusing use in judicial opinions, is perhaps
14 And at disproportionate length as compared with the praise. For,
despite the adverse criticism, the book is sure to have wide constructiva
effects on legal thinking and pedagogy.
3z See BERTRVND RUSSELL, WHY MEN FIGHT.
's See GEORGE MEREDITH, ESSAY ON C0mEDY AND THE COMIC SPIRIT.
I Pp. 122-25. .-
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the most difficult confronting a teacher of corporation law. The material
here included should prove extremely helpful; it is not an attempt to
dogmatize or to state correct definitions, but rather to suggest the reasons
for the varying approaches of the economist, the accountant, and the judge,
and to present a caveat and a challenge to the alert student.
Material dealing with the issuance of stock and with the distinction be-
tween unissued and treasury stock is followed by a section of sixty pages
illustrating various methods by which "throughout the history of corpora-
tions men have attempted to secure shares of stock without making a cor-
responding contribution to the corporate assets". In connection with these
cases, Mr. Berle introduces his newly-christened "rule of equitable con-
tribution": since the power to issue stock, like other management powers,
is held in trust, it must be exercised only in such a way that the incoming
shareholder "shall have contributed to the capital of the corporation on an
equitable basis". The cases and statutory material in this section are
especially well selected, ample consideration being given to the modern
problem of the power of directors to fix the price at which no-par shares
are to be issued. Fifty pages are then devoted to the shareholders' pre-
emptive right, which is analyzed as being primarily the right to invest more
capital in a successful enterprise rather than the right to protect the
shareholder's relative voting position or participation in corporate assets.
The section on dividends embodies no great change from the older books,
except, perhaps, the greater emphasis on the problem of dividends out of
"paid-in surplus". Mr. Berle's note suggesting different types of such
surplus furnishes a wholesome warning that this problem is more com-
plicated than has sometimes been assumed.
For want of cases defining the rights of holders of "option warrants", a
form of such warrant is included. Cases on preferred and "special" classes
of stock follow, with sufficient empasis on the recent cases on non-cumula-
tive preferred stock and various "implications of the preference contract".
A very brief treatment of the purchase, retirement, and reduction of stock
completes the consideration of stock, and is followed by a section on "Evi-
dences of Claims on the Corporate Assets", principally bonds, This sec-
tion covers less than 100 pages and includes a form of corporate mortgage
and a few cases on the sinking fund and after-acquired property clauses,
the bondholders' control over the management, their relation intcr so,
their rights to sue on the bonds and to force a foreclosure, the obligations
of the trustee, and redemption and retirement.
Part II begins by tracing the new enterprise from an embryonic idea
through the stages of promotion, negotiation with investment bankers, un-
derwriting and selling syndicates, and public offering of securities. An
intensely interesting financial history of Nash Motors Company is printed
as an illustration of some phases of the financial process. This material
should hold the attention of even the most jaded third-year student, al-
though some teachers, if not students, may object to the author's char-
acterizations of certain steps taken by the company and the bankers, Lee,
Higginson & Co.
The protection afforded to the originator of the idea of the enterprise
against the appropriation of his idea, and to the "finder" (the intermediary
in the negotiation between the promoters and the bankers) against being
"squeezed out", is then considered, together with familiar cases on pro-
moter's profits. The investment banking operation is outlined in a brief
note, followed by a complaint in an action for breach of a bankers' com-
mitment. Further steps in the process are illustrated by cases construing
various provisions of underwriting agreements, and by a form of "selling
group letter". Problems arising out of the public offering and the bankers'
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circular are suggested, and a number of cases as to the remedies of pur-
chasers for misrepresentation, are included. The process of listing the
securities on a public market is illustrated by rules of the Committee on
Stock List of the New York Stock Exchange and a sample listing applica-
tion. There is no material, however, on "Blue Sky" laws.
The next section includes not only familiar cases on the private purchase
of stock by directors and officers without full disclosure, but also cases
on the liability of directors for action taken with a view to affecting the
market.2  There follow cases on the use of subsidiary corporations and
on merger and sale of corporate assets. With the merger cases is happily
included as a "business precedent" from the abortive Bethlehem-Youngs-
town merger, the provocative letter of Haskins and Sells and other ac-
countants as to the fairness of the merger terms to the Youngstown share-
holders.
The concluding material, on reorganization, consists only of a very brief
bibliography, a plan and agreement for a voluntary reorganization, and a
bondholders' protective committee agreement. It seems rather paradoxical
that a collection of materials on "corporation finance" should not include
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd,3 which many instructors have at-
tempted to cover in the ordinary course on corporations. A smattering
of knowledge of this difficult field, however, seems of little value, and the
writer agrees that all of this material is better left to a specialized course
or individual study.
Inadequate as the foregoing outline of Mr. Berle's collection must be, it
immediately suggests the question as to whether the book is suitable for
schools which have but one course on the law of private corporations. A
teacher accustomed to the casebooks of Richards, Warren, or Canfield and
Wormser will miss from this collection material on de facto corporations,
the powers of corporate officers, many phases of the doctrine of ultra
vires, and a few other subjects. Some may also miss the traditional ex-
tended introductory chapter on the "nature" of a corporation, and the
things which it is not, and the congeries of problems as to "disregarding
the corporate fiction" or, if you prefer, "overriding the corporate con-
ception". Other instructors, however, may feel that it is the excessive em-
phasis on these topics which has made the traditional course on corpora-
tion law seem to many students impractical and too far removed from the
problems faced in practice by the corporation lawyer. The writer believes
that the subjects covered by Mr. Berle are, in general, much more import-
ant than those omitted. The approach and arrangement is stimulating,
and should facilitate and vivify the teaching of the subject. In short, the
book is an excellent casebook on the law of private corporations-and one
may hazard the guess that the substitution of a new name reflects primarily
a wholesome insistance that modern corporate problems are largely financial
and that they imperatively demand that the law of private corporations
be cut loose from its roots in the law of charitable and municipal cor-
porations.
The writer believes, however, that as a collection of materials on the
specialized problems of finance, hond issues, mergers, etc., the book will
be disappointing to many. This field is obviously one in which but a small
part of "the law" appears in the reports. Here the teacher who is not
in direct touch with corporation law practice is handicapped and looks
hopefully to Mr. Berle in his almost unique position as both teacher and
2 See also Mr. Berle's recent article, Liability for Stock Market Manipu-
lation (1931) 31 CoL. L. Rav. 264.
3 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931 (1913).
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active member of the metropolitan corporate bar. The limits of size
doubtless prevented a detailed treatment of the specialized problems in a
book also covering the general principles of corporation law, but the result
is that on these specialties the book furnishes only a starting point, and
will not be of great use in advanced courses devoted to such problems. Mr.
Berle' expository notes are valuable here, as throughout the book, but
they are tantalizingly brief.
The specimens of corporate documents and the frequent collections of
statutory references are helpful features. More frequent references to
law review articles might well have been made, for example, in the section
dealing with subsidiary corporations no citation is given to the recent
study of Douglas and Shanks.4
One may perhaps be permitted to regret that Part II depicts the "finan-
cial processes in action" as a rather orderly succession of steps from the
generation of the idea through the public offering of the securities, with
no consideration of the terror-inspiring device all too frequently used to
interrupt the processes of financing-the stockholder's suit. Richard's
casebook contains a section of over fifty pages devoted to this subject,
and it is surprising that a re-analysis of the materials of corporation law
from a functional and realistic point of view should result in a reduction
of the emphasis on this pfoblem. True, Mr. Berle uses, in his analytical
study in Part I, a number of decisions handed down in such suits; and
an alert student will probably read much between the lines of Vice-
Chancellor Lane's caustic remarks concerning Clarence Venner and his
corporations.5 But surely this double-edged weapon, developed as a heroic
remedy for threatened irreparable wrongs to minority stockholders, but
equally available for the sinister purposes of the "strike suit", challanges
study as a dynamic phase of the process of financing. Behind the hostility
of many corporate lawyers to Mr. Berle's suggested rules of powers in
trust and equitable control, 6 there apparently lies a fear, born of bitter
and hectic experience, that these rules may operate principally for the
benefit of the corporate sharp-shooter. The present collection of cases
gives no sign that Mr. Berle regards this fear as requiring serious con-
sideration.
It might also be wholesome for the student of corporation finance to
consider, as bearing upon the complexities of many financing transactions,
provisions of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, the Federal Income Tax laws
and various state foreign corporation laws. Obviously, anything approach-
ing full consideration of the bearing of these provisions can not be achieved
in a single course such as that Mr. Berle outlines; but an introduction to
these matters would help to prevent the impression that the complexities
of many financial and intercorporate transactions are all the result of
"corporate skullduggery".
Chicago, Ill. WMER G. KATZ.
4 liulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations (1929) 39
YALF L. J. 193.
5 General Investment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 88 N. J. Eq.
237, 102 Atl. 252 (1917), printed in Berle at p. 475.
6 See reviews of Berle's Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance by
Swaine in (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1003, and by Kline in (1929) 42 HAnV.
L. Ruv. 714.
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Leziani d! Filosofa del Diritto. By Giorgio Del Vecchio. CitM
di Castello, Societh Anonima Tipographica "Leonardo da
Vinci", 1930. pp. iv, 351.
THis work by the distinguished editor of Rirista Intcrnadonal di Filsoia
del Diritto and professor at the University of Rome seems to have had its
first public appearance in a Spanish translation by Professor Luis Re-
cas6ns supplemented by original notes of the translator.' The Spanish
version coincides with Del Vecchio's completion of twenty-five years of
activity as professor of legal philosophy successively at Ferrara, Sassari,
Messina, Bologna, and Rome. This event was recently celebrated by pub-
lication of a "Festschrkft" in the author's honor which contained contribu-
tions of the leaders in legal philosophy of Italy and of scholars in various
other countries.2
The author needs no identification for those who have any concern with
or for philosophy in general or legal philosophy in particular. His first
introduction to readers of our language was by means of an article under
the title "Positive Right" published in an English law review.3 This elo-
quent essay was soon followed by publication in English of a trilogy of
separate but logically connected legal-philosophical studies.' The English
title for this collection was "The Formal Bases of Law".5
With respect to the title of the translated volume, an eminent writer,
Professor Biagio Brugi of the University of Pisa in a communication to
Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincel remarked that "ld- fradzaione lcttcrale
del titolo in Basi formali . . .potrebbe far cadere in im grande cquivoco".
Professor Brugi then suggested by way of improvement "essential char-
acteristics ("caratteri essenziali") or "constitutive elements" ("ekrncnti
congtitutivi') .6 The English version (being the excellent translation of the
late John Lisle) contains an illuminating and competent editorial preface
by Professor Joseph H. Drake, who has considered all the problems raised by
use of the word "formal" both from the standpoint of usage by philosophers
and of etymology. Professor Drake shows that "the primitive meaning of
'formal' was 'essential'" and that the antonymic use of 'formal' (as op-
posed to 'essential') was a development of "a comparatively modern
period." 7 Professor Brugi's concern for lay misapprehension may there-
fore be put aside, although the risk must be admitted, but only on the
assumption that one reads only the title of the book.
Coming now to a comparison of the "Lezioni" with the "Formal Bases",
we find that they are entirely different in form, purpose, and execution.
The earlier trilogy was written by a man in his late twenties just at the
beginning of his teaching career. The present work is that of the same
author at the height of his reputation and in the maturity of his powers.
The trilogy is heavily documented after the fashion of the doctoral thesis.
These earlier papers are not easy reading but they embody a mine of
' DEL VmccHIo, FILOSOFLA DEL DERECHO (1929): Libreria Bosch, Barcelona.
2 STUDI FILOSOFIco-GiuRmIcI DEDICATI A GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO NEL XAV
ANNO DI INSEGNAMENTO (1904-1929) : Modena, SocietZi Tipografica Modenese.3 Sulla positizit& come carettcre del diritto, (1911) RIVISTA DI FILOSOFMA:
translation in (1913) 38 LAW IAGAZINE AND REVIEW 293.
4 (1905) 1 presupposti fiilosofici della nwzionw dcl diritto; (1900) II con-
cetto del diritto; (1908) II concetto della natura c it principio del diritto.
- DEL VEccrlo, (1914) THE ForAI BASES Op LAW.
OReale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei: Rendiconti Vol. XXXI fasc. 12
(17 Dec. 1922).
7 Op. cit. supra, note 5, pp. ,x--iii.
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patiently collected reference material of great value. They were bettor
suited for the expert than the lay reader. The "Lezioni", although de-
signed for the novice, would in truth have been better adapted to our needs
than the essays already translated. The present work contains every-
thing of essential value in the essays, produced in an easy, flowing, and
beautiful style.
The work is divided into a General part (consisting of an Introduction
and a brief history of legal philosophy) and a Special part (dealing with
the concept of law, the origin and historical evolution of law, and the
rational basis of law). The work combines what in this country would be
called "jurisprudence", with legal philosophy. The historical part stops
short with the living. Living legal philosophers are named but not dis-
cussed. This limitation is at once understandable and regrettable. The
author would have been one of the most competent persons to appraise the
contributions to legal philosophy of the existing epoch.
The author is everywhere labeled a neo-Kantian. To the reviewer this
qualification seems unnecessary and in substance untrue. Del Vecchio and
Kelsen, it seems to us, keep the Kantian doctrine within the ancient land-
marks as no other representative of this time of the Critical philosophy
has done. Del Vecchio and Stammler are often spoken of together, but
Stammler appears to have modified the Kantian program by the elements
of voluntarism and of teleology.8 It is, however, curious to note the im-
portant breach between Del Vecchio and Kelsen on the nature of law.
According to Del Vecchio law is a formal concept and is independent of
the state. "Ubi homo, ibi societas; ubi societas, ibi ius; ergo, ubi heno, ibi
iu.s." 9 Kelsen, on the contrary, identifies law and state.1 0 This conflict is
disturbing but not necessarily fatal. It does, however, call for attention.
Kant's system arose somewhat as an historical accident. Humo had
arrived at scepticism in dealing with the concept of causation. 'Kant sought
to solve Hume's problem (i.e., to show a necessary connection a priori be-
tween cause and effect) and in that effort (that he succeeded is doubtful)
found a single principle for the deduction of concepts of pure understand-
ing. He developed a system of a priori synthetical principles which are
the basis of possible experience but which can not be referred to things in
themselves. Mind was set apart from outward things. Kant's principal
work appeared before the discovery of the conservation of matter and
energy, the doctrine of evolution, the laws of thermodynamics, the electronic
theory of matter, and the more recent theories of special and general rela-
tivity. The newer ideas do not abolish the Kantian system, but, on the
whole, they have tended to diminish its influence. Kant formulated his ideas
with amazing confidence in his own position and with extraordinary care
and skill, but yet as one attempts to follow him into the transcendental
atmosphere where his reasoning leads, and as one contemplates the luxur-
iant manifoldness of all that which lies beyond the mind, the reflection in-
trudes itself that subtilitas naturae subtilitatem argulnentandi multis parti-
bus superat."
Del Vecchio's chief insistence is on the priority to experience of the
8 Cf. Berolzheimer in (1911) Archiv. f. Rechts-und Wirtschaftsphiloso-
prie Vol. V Heft 2 p. 311, 320.
9 Del Vecchio Sulla Statualita. del diritto (1929) Riv. Int. d. Fil. d. Dlritto.
An. IX fasc. 1, p. 1 (19).
10 Cf. Kelsen (1925) Ailgemeine Staatslehre 6-13. Cf. Jones, Modern Dis-
cussions of the Aims and Methods of Legal Science (1931) 47 LAw Q.
REv. 62, 78-86.
1 1 KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT (1781).
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concept, law. It is hardly necessary to say that the terms 'a priori' and 'a
posterior' have nothing to do with subjective recognition or with temporal
connection or with innateness. The realistic philosophy which perhaps
today predominates does not put aside the basic laws of logic or the ideas
which spring from logic. It admits a priori ideas as points of reference to
universals. Modern science has not abolished reason.
The problems involved do not for the present submit to solution by
way of definite demonstrations, but the assignment of a priori truth to the
mind as the lawgiver of reality does not today find wide attraction. There
is also the question whether Kant and Del Vecchio have not extended the
field of the a priori beyond legitimate bounds. Mathematics is readily ad-
mitted, but can we extend the idea to such purely historical notions as
law, state, and justice? 12 To avoid misapprehension, the reviewer is ready
to admit the existence of thought forms which have the merit of great
utility, composed of pure and empirical elements. Jural relationship is
one of these, and, as we think, law is another.
The thoughtful lawyer must solve these problems for himself. To do
so he must, however, travel far afield. He must read the K'itil itself-
if he can. But first he should read the Prolegomena13 The KEitik notori-
ously is one of the most difficult of all books but it reduces to dialectic
elements not reasonably beyond understanding.
One thing more as to Del Vecchio's book may be pointed out-it em-
phasizes two elements: the problem of Truth (as based on the Kitil; der
rein? Vernunft) and the problem of Value (as based on the categorical
imperative of the (1788) Kritik der praftischcn Vernunft). On the
whole, Del Vecchio's new book is one of the most readable expositions now
available of the consequences of the Kantian system as applied to law.
Northwestern University Law School A. KocounmE
Lawful Pursuit of Gain. By Max Radin. Boston and New York,
Houghton Alifflin Co., 1931. pp. 144.
THIS is a scholarly little book tracing through the years the development
of certain legal and ethical standards of the market place. Delightfully
written, it makes no effort to prove a thesis. There is no loud voiced as-
sertion to bolster a faltering argument, no reform to sell. Though it con-
tains many suggestive historical references, the book can not be regarded
as an exhaustive or important historical work. The utilitarian
will credit it principally with an entertainment value.
Of the many points at which "law" and "morals" have been at odds,
Professor Radin has exploited only a few. In legal terminology these are
selling price, usury, bankruptcy, warranty and unfair competition. But
this enumeration gives no suggestion of the discussion, for example, of the
centuries old debate over the ethics of profit making or of interest charges
for the use of money. Nor does it indicate the author's entertaining treat-
ment of the many modern developments in advertising and their relation
to the law of warranty.
At times Professor Radin seems to ask too much. For instance, the
12 The present writer previously raised that question in his review of
Del Vecchio's LA GiusTzIA (Bologna, 1924), (1925) 19 ILL. L. REV. 497.
13 (1783) "PROLEGODIENA ZU EINER JEDEN KUNETIGEN IMETAPHYSIX, DIE ALS
WISSENSCHAYT AUFTRETEN XONNEN." A highly recommended explanation
of Kant is (1876) STADLE, DIE GRUNDSXTZE DER REINEN ERKENNTISTHEORm
IN DER KANTISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE.
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impression is given that wide advertisement of the fact that a certain kind
of soap floats, though legal, is not ethically.commendable, since it has never
been shown that floating is a quality of any particular value in soap. But
when compared, let us say, with the publicity given by some universities to
the great quantity of important "research" they expect soon to complete,
an advertiser's assertion that its soap floats, which at least has the virtue
of being true, is a harmless indiscretion. Of course it is just such oppor-
tunities for differences of opinion which make the subject of the book
interesting, and its discussion inconclusive.
New Haven, Conn. Roscou TURNER.
Mr. Justice Holmes, edited by Felix Frankfurter. New York,
Coward-McCann, Inc., 1931. pp. viii, 241. $2.50.
THIS book is offered to Mr. Justice Holmes upon his ninetieth birthday
"as a symbol of homagd and affection." The tribute is the more sincere
because it was not produced for the occasion. None of the pieces makes
an original appearance here; the earliest of them goes back fifteen years,
the latest is to be found in the Holmes number of the Harvard Law Review.
The essays voice general and thoughtful appreciation of a master by mem-
bers of the craft who are themselves skilled workmen. They are written
late enough to catch the manner of the man, to record his mature achieve-
ment, and to sense the contemporary significance of the work. They come too
early to present his work in perspective, to appraise his contribution to the
system of law in the making, and to discover his distinctive place among
the immortals. The contributors to the volume are John Dewey, Learned
Hand, Elizabeth Shipley Sargeant, Joseph Redlich, Morris R. Cohen, Philip
Littell, John H. Wigmore, Walter Lippmann, Harold J. Laski, Benjamin
N. Cardozo, and Felix Frankfurter. This list is testimony enough that
"Holmes belongs to philosophy and letters as well as to law."
W.HH.
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